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Executive Summary 
 
As facial recognition systems (FRS) become widely available, a growing number of local 
governing bodies across the country have adopted these technologies. Without regulating how 
and when these technologies are used, the adoption of FRS by municipal governments has the 
potential to violate civil liberties and disproportionately harm marginalized groups. FRS may be 
an invaluable tool for law enforcement; however, best practices must be adopted to curb their 
misuse, specifically at the municipal level. We propose that cities considering procurement of 
FRS create an independent privacy advisory commission with a clear mandate, guaranteed 
cooperation from local government, technology expertise, and community stakeholder input. 
 
I. The Problems with Facial Recognition 
 
FRS are increasingly used by municipal law enforcement to enhance safety and cut costs; 
however, the technology is prone to error and can lead to widespread surveillance, threatening 
residents’ rights to privacy. FRS analyze an image of a person’s face to create a unique 
mathematical ‘facial signature’ composed of measurements such as the distance between the 
eyes. This signature is compared to a database of identified faces and the FRS returns the top 
likely matches. Over 50 law enforcement agencies currently use FRS to match faces in real time, 
recorded video, or photos to databases including mug shots and DMV records.1 While law 
enforcement has achieved great successes with FRS, such as identifying the suspect in the 2018 
Capital Gazette shooting in Maryland, safeguards are necessary to protect vulnerable 
communities.2 
 
Errors in FRS disproportionately affect individuals who are African American, other racial 
minorities, female, youth, and/or elderly. Some FRS falsely match African Americans up to 100 
times more often than white individuals.3 These disproportionate errors are due to lack of 
 
1 Garvie, C., Bedoya, A., Frankle, J. "Perpetual Line Up." Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology. 18 
Oct. 2016, https://www.perpetuallineup.org/. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
2 Brandom, R. "How facial recognition helped police identify the Capital Gazette shooter." The Verge. 29 Jun. 
2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/29/17518364/facial-recognition-police-identify-capital-gazette-shooter. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
3 Grother, P., Ngan, M., Hanaoka, K. "Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT), Part 3: Demographic Effects." 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Dec. 2019, 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
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diversity in both the photo sets used to train the matching software and the technologists 
designing the software. Faces in training sets can be more than 83% white and 74% male, 
skewing software accuracy towards these demographics and limiting applicability for people of 
color and women.4 Further, technologists developing the software are overwhelmingly white and 
male and may encode the software with their implicit biases, making decisions on the design and 
data that underrepresent the needs of other demographic groups.5 
  
Despite well-documented concerns about the accuracy of FRS, law enforcement agencies deploy 
the technology with little to no testing, with errors often compounded by misuse.1 Populations 
vulnerable to policing, such as African Americans, are disproportionately represented in mugshot 
databases, meaning that errors in FRS can lead to higher rates of African Americans being 
falsely labeled as criminals.6 Other vulnerable populations, such as children, also generate high 
error rates for FRS; this is especially concerning as police departments like the NYPD already 
use facial recognition databases that include thousands of juveniles as young as 11.7,8 Since half 
of all American adults are in a law enforcement facial recognition database, inaccurate matching 
by FRS could impact over 100 million people.1 
 
Even if FRS were fully accurate, they increase widespread public surveillance by law 
enforcement. FRS used to profile political, religious or ethnic groups threaten freedoms of 
expression at the core of democracy. Chinese authorities use FRS to track and profile Uighurs, 
an ethnic minority group.9 In 2015, police in Baltimore used facial recognition to identify 
protesters with outstanding unrelated warrants and make arrests.10 Despite these abuses, in 2016, 
only one U.S. law enforcement agency had policy preventing the use of FRS to surveil people 
engaging in protected free speech.1 Only 17% of U.S. adults greatly trust law enforcement to use 
FRS responsibly, with significant variability by race and age; African-Americans and young 
 
4 Shellenbarger, S. "A Crucial Step for Averting AI Disasters." The Wall Street Journal. 13 Feb. 2019, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-crucial-step-for-avoiding-ai-disasters-11550069865. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
5 Burke, A. "Science and Engineering Labor Force." National Science Board. 26 Sep. 2019, 
https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20198/assets/nsb20198.pdf. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
6 Snow, J. "Amazon's Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress With Mugshots.” American Civil 
Liberties Union. 26 Jul. 2018, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-
face-recognition-falsely-matched-28. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
7 Goldstein, J., Watkins, A. "She Was Arrested at 14. Then Her Photo Went to a Facial Recognition Database." The 
New York Times. 1 Aug. 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/nyregion/nypd-facial-recognition-children-
teenagers.html. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
8 Grother, P., Ngan, M., Hanaoka, K. "Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT), Part 2: Identification." National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Dec. 2019, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
9 Wee, S., Mozur, P. “China Uses DNA to Map Faces, With Help From the West.” The New York Times. 3 Dec. 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/business/china-dna-uighurs-xinjiang.html. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
10 Wenger, Y. "Police used facial recognition technology to help identify uncooperative suspect in Capital Gazette 
shooting." The Baltimore Sun.  29 Jun. 2018, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-facial-recognition-
suspect-identity-20180629-story.html. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
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Americans are less likely to share this trust than their white and older counterparts.11 This 
potential for abuse and lack of trust suggests a need for greater community input and oversight of 
how law enforcement uses FRS. 
 
II. Past Attempts to Regulate Facial Recognition Systems 
 
The NYU Policing Project has identified three broad categories of FRS regulation in the U.S. 
These include (1) general regulations that ban, pause, or study FRS, (2) operations-based 
regulations that control how FRS are deployed, and (3) data-based regulations that restrict the 
images used to operate FRS.12 
 
Local attempts to regulate FRS, particularly in government use, have struggled to keep up with 
rapid FRS deployment. Three states (California, New Hampshire, and Oregon) and five cities 
(Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco, Brookline, and Somerville) have enacted some form of ban 
on government use of FRS.13 However, these bans are already facing legal challenges and do not 
prevent private institutions within a city from using their own FRS. These technologies are 
ubiquitous, implemented on every smartphone and in use across the private sector. Furthermore, 
many facial recognition algorithms in use are designed and sold by non-U.S. companies, raising 
issues over who has the authority to regulate the sale of this technology within U.S. borders. 
Therefore, more thorough and evolving mechanisms must be established to regulate FRS across 
the country. 
 
The regulation of FRS enjoys bipartisan federal support; however, this has not translated to 
meaningful action. During the 2019-2020 legislative cycle, there have been at least four 
proposed federal bills to limit the technology in some way.14 For example, the Commercial 
Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019 would require businesses to receive consent before using 
facial recognition software.15 However, slow bureaucracy at the federal level has led to few 
tangible results, creating a vacuum for local governments to step in with more flexible, tailored 
local solutions. 
 
 
11 Smith, A. "More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use Facial Recognition Responsibly." Pew 
Research Center. 5 Sep. 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/09/05/more-than-half-of-u-s-adults-trust-
law-enforcement-to-use-facial-recognition-responsibly/. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
12 Hrick, P., Heydari, F. "The Growing World of Face Recognition Legislation." Policing Project. 
https://www.policingproject.org/frlaws. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
13 Read, M. "Why We Should Ban Facial Recognition Technology." New York Magazine. 30 Jan. 2020, 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/why-we-should-ban-facial-recognition-technology.html. Accessed 12 Apr. 
2020. 
14 Ghaffary, S. “How facial recognition became the most feared technology in the US." Vox. 9 Aug. 2019, 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/9/20799022/facial-recognition-law. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
15 "S.847 - Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019." 14 Mar. 2019, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/847. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
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A well-documented attempt at local FRS regulation was the Automated Decision Systems Task 
Force in New York City. Established in 2017, the task force was supposed to examine how 
automated systems, including facial recognition software, were used throughout the municipal 
government to guide decision-making processes.16 However, they encountered multiple 
administrative hurdles over a two-year data gathering process. First, agencies were required to 
self-identify automated systems for the task force to evaluate, but many employees were either 
unable to identify these or were unaware of which systems were automated. Furthermore, the 
task force did not have the legal authority to compel agencies to provide information, reducing 
their ability to conduct oversight.17 
 
Similarly, the United Kingdom has struggled to regulate FRS because it lacks a centralized law 
guiding the use of live facial recognition in spite of its ongoing use by the Metropolitan Police 
Service.18 Instead, different components of FRS, such as surveillance cameras, use of data, and 
legislative oversight, are delegated to at least four different independently appointed 
commissioners.19 This ambiguity has caused confusion over who has the jurisdiction to regulate 
FRS and their use by law enforcement. These problems could be addressed through the creation 
of a centralized authority with clearly delineated authorities and jurisdiction. 
 
On the other hand, Illinois’ 2008 Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) has been hailed by 
privacy advocates for its strength in addressing biometric privacy violations.20, 21, 22 BIPA 
regulates the use and storage of biometric data, including eye scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, and 
facial/hand scans. Its most important provisions include: requiring collectors of biometric data to 
establish guidelines for securely storing and permanently destroying data within three years after 
collection; informing subjects of the collection of their biometric data; a ban on the sale of a 
person's biometric information; and a ban on disclosures of a person’s biometric information 
without their consent, except in extraordinary circumstances such as a court warrant. In 2019, 
two court cases, Rosenbach v. Six Flags and Patel v. Facebook, upheld the use of BIPA to 
 
16 Lecher, C. "NYC's algorithm task force was 'a waste,' member says." The Verge. 20 Nov. 2019, 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/20/20974379/nyc-algorithm-task-force-report-de-blasio. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
17 Richardson, R. "Confronting Black Boxes: A Shadow Report of the New York City Automated Decision System 
Task Force." AI Now Institute. 4 Dec. 2019, https://ainowinstitute.org/ads-shadowreport-2019.pdf. Accessed 12 
Apr. 2020. 
18 Thomas, E. "Facial recognition is in London. So how should we regulate it?." Wired. 16 Mar. 2020, 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/regulate-facial-recognition-laws. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
19 Chertoff, P. "Facial Recognition Has Its Eye on the U.K." Lawfare. 7 Feb. 2020, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-has-its-eye-uk. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
20 "Biometric Information Privacy Act.” http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
21 Wessler, N. "A Federal Court Sounds the Alarm on the Privacy Harms of Facial Recognition Technology." 
American Civil Liberties Union. 9 Aug. 2019, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/federal-court-sounds-alarm-privacy-harms-face. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
22 Schwartz, A. "New Attack on the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act." Electronic Frontier Foundation. 10 Apr. 2018, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/new-attack-illinois-biometric-privacy-act. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
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maintain accountability and provide financial compensation for privacy violations.23, 24 However, 
BIPA exempts state and local governments from its requirements, allowing for the use of FRS in 
policing, prisons, and other public services and leaving a regulatory gap for the oversight of 
these important operations. 
 
III. Policy Recommendations 
 
We recommend that local municipalities establish commissions modeled after the Privacy 
Advisory Commission in Oakland, CA.25 Establishment at the municipal level is ideal to directly 
engage with emergent and localized needs of police, city agencies, and community groups. To 
ensure their effectiveness and avoid challenges similar to those faced in the UK and New York 
City, commissions should meet the following criteria. 
 
First, commissions must have a clear mandate and responsibilities. Commission responsibilities 
should include advising and providing technical assistance for the local governing body on best 
practices for the use of FRS. The commission should review and advise the city on FRS 
technology prior to adoption, conduct public hearings, create model legislation, and analyze 
legislation related to resident privacy. Commissions should also have veto, or at minimum 
voting, authority over the procurement and use of FRS on a case-by-case basis and on any future 
legislation pertaining to FRS. As necessary, commissions can also advise on the use of other 
surveillance technologies that may infringe upon privacy concerns. 
 
Second, commissions must be guaranteed cooperation and financial support from the local 
governing body, including some degree of authority over relevant stakeholders such as law 
enforcement. The municipality will need to commit staffing to support the commission’s 
investigations, provide documentation of technologies, allocate City Council time, and ensure 
transparent communication. Costs to enact the commission’s recommendations may include 
increasing cybersecurity and technical infrastructure, strengthening procurement procedures, and 
facilitating cooperation with vendors. Incorporating commission recommendations can ensure 
city investment is directed effectively, prevent lawsuits on mishandling of data, foster 
community trust, and protect the residents’ civil rights and liberties. 
 
Third, commissions should include technology expertise alongside representation from legal, law 
enforcement, and auditing experts. Technology expertise is crucial to understanding the ethical 
 
23 "Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.” Illinois Courts. 25 Jan. 2019, 
https://courts.illinois.gov/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2019/123186.pdf. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
24 "Patel v. Facebook." Electronic Privacy Information Center. https://epic.org/amicus/bipa/patel-v-facebook/. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
25 "Privacy Advisory Commission.” City of Oakland. 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/government/o/CityAdministration/d/PrivacyAdvisoryCommission/index.htm. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
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implications of rapidly changing FRS. If it is challenging for smaller municipalities to find this 
expertise, inter-city partnerships cna leverage resources through formal or informal regional 
frameworks. In addition, we recommend governing bodies facing these challenges turn to local 
research institutions or networks such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, and the National Science Policy Network to ensure these commissions are 
properly equipped to regulate potential challenging technical issues. 
 
Finally, the commission should be composed of volunteer members dedicated to community 
representation. Similar to many local commissions in the U.S, the easiest way to staff such a 
commission would be through appointments by elected municipal officials. To ensure a variety 
of community stakeholder inputs, governing bodies should also consider designating positions 
for representatives from traditionally underrepresented interest groups. These commissions 
should host regular (e.g. monthly) meetings that are open to the community and include 
opportunities for public comment. 
 
IV. Community Return on Investment 
 
We understand that the creation and support of such a commission will require local 
municipalities’ resources. Based on the City of Oakland’s Privacy Advisory Commission, we 
estimate this at 10-15 staff hours per month to support a monthly meeting, with potential 
additional to implement any commission proposals.26 We anticipate that such responsibilities can 
be absorbed by existing government infrastructure. Furthermore, municipalities could see overall 
costs decrease by using commission resources to perform work that was previously outsourced 
or done less efficiently by other government entities, such as vetting or reporting on the use of 
FRS technology. 
 
The creation of a privacy advisory commission can also preserve democratic and local control 
over law enforcement. As the federal government has increased grants for surveillance 
equipment in local municipalities, law enforcement has become less financially dependent and 
subject to oversight by local government.27 Commissions, if properly structured, can create 
ordinances and provide oversight to ensure the ethical use of FRS by law enforcement, 
regardless of funding sources. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
26 "Creation of a Privacy Advisory Commission." City of Oakland. 26 Oct. 2015, 
https://oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2503814&GUID=DD0D90E4-1084-44D0-8E74-
D7FA2530724D&Options=&Search=. Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
27 Katayama, D. "Oakland's Privacy Commission Could Lead Nation on Surveillance Oversight." KQED. 22 Jan. 
2016, https://www.kqed.org/news/10824952/oaklands-privacy-commission-could-be-one-of-most-active-in-country. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2020. 
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As FRS continue to proliferate, we recommend that cities considering their adoption create an 
independent advisory commission to safeguard against the violation of civil liberties and 
disproportionate harm to marginalized groups. Such a commission must include a clear mandate, 
guaranteed cooperation from local government, technology expertise, and community 
stakeholder input. The commission’s role is not to impede technological development, but to 
ensure implementation is safe, efficient and in line with the needs of the community. If properly 
implemented with these guidelines, our proposal can decrease costs and ensure local control over 
the ethical governmental use of FRS. 
